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Party Control, Party Competition and Public Service
Performance
GEORGE A. BOYNE, OLIVER JAMES, PETER JOHN AND
NICOLAI PETROVSKY*
This article assesses party effects on the performance of public services. A policy-seeking model,
hypothesizing that left and right party control affects performance, and an instrumental model, where
all parties strive to raise performance, are presented. The framework also suggests a mixed model in
which party effects are contingent on party competition, with parties raising performance as increasing
party competition places their control of government at increasing risk. These models are tested against
panel data on English local governments’ party control and public service performance. The results
question the traditional account of left and right parties, showing a positive relationship between right-
wing party control and performance that is contingent on a sufﬁciently high level of party competition.
The ﬁndings suggest left–right models should be reframed for the contemporary context.
Advocates of the traditional view of party government argue that political parties matter
for public policy because different parties in government seek to realize their policy
preferences and govern accordingly. Partly for these reasons, scholars have paid
considerable attention to the effects of differences between parties as arrayed on a
left–right dimension. The main ﬁnding from this literature is that parties of the left – at the
national level – tend to spend more on social and related policies than do parties of the right.1
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1 Francis G. Castles, ed., The Impact of Political Parties: Politics and Policies in Capitalist Democratic
States (London: Sage, 1982); Alberto Alesina, Nouriel Roubini and Gerald D. Cohen, Political Cycles
and the Macroeconomy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the
Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Louis M. Imbeau, Franc¸ois Pe´try and
Moktar Lamari, ‘Left–Right Party Ideology and Government Policies: A Meta-Analysis’, European
Journal of Political Research, 40 (2001), 1–29; Tor Midtbø, ‘The Impact of Parties, Economic Growth,
and Public Sector Expansion: A Comparison of Long-Term Dynamics in the Scandinavian and Anglo-
American Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, 35 (1999), 199–223; Duane Swank,
Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Manfred G. Schmidt, ‘When Parties Matter: A Review of the
Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Inﬂuence on Public Policy’, European Journal of Political Research, 30
(1996), 155–83; Michael D. MacDonald and Ian Budge, Elections, Parties, Democracy: Conferring the
Median Mandate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Hans Keman, ‘Parties and Government:
Features of Governing in Representative Democracies’, in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, eds,
Handbook of Party Politics (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2006), pp. 160–74.
At the state and local level, demands for service provision tend to drive up the expenditure of
left-controlled governments, in contrast to the demands on governments controlled by the
right for lower taxes and service provision by the private sector.2 However, other researchers
strongly question this view, arguing that it is anachronistic and that left–right differences are
symptomatic of a more ideological age, and ﬁnding evidence of only weak contemporary party
effects. Research of this kind has stressed upon how global pressures reduce autonomy for
action and lead to convergence in party policy platforms.3 Some researchers on electoral politics
similarly point out the rise of valence issues and suggest that parties in government increasingly
concentrate on competence rather than on implementing different policy positions.4
In this article we develop a framework to empirically evaluate these different views of
party effects as two competing models. However, our approach also allows for a third
model in which party effects are contingent on the degree of competition between parties.
Party competition is a key feature of the party representative government model in which
voters have a genuine choice between parties to form governments.5 In our model of
contingent party effects, greater competition reduces the security of incumbent parties’
tenure and erodes left–right party effects. This modelling makes the existence of party
effects contingent on low competition between parties.
We examine party effects where they matter most to citizens, in the context of policy
outcomes that they directly experience. Much previous work has analysed party effects on
policies or expenditures rather than examining policy outcomes, with a lack of data being
a major constraint on research.6 In areas where policy outcomes have been examined, the
contexts have had external constraints limiting the scope of governments with different
policy priorities to implement their plans, notably in economic and welfare policy.7
However, even in this area, policy outcomes related to coalitional and party differences
have been observed, particularly in economic, education and training policy.8 We analyse
party effects on English local government public service performance, with performance
deﬁned as the effectiveness of those services in the local area in which citizens live.
Citizens are affected by local services on a daily basis, and the lack of previous studies of
2 Timothy Besley and Anne Case, ‘Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Empirical Evidence from
the United States’, Journal of Economic Literature, 41 (2003), 7–73; George A. Boyne, ‘Theory,
Methodology and Results in Political Science – The Case of Output Studies’, British Journal of Political
Science, 15 (1985), 473–515; George A. Boyne, ‘Assessing Party Effects on Local Policies: A Quarter
Century of Progress or Eternal Recurrence?’ Political Studies, 44 (1996), 232–52; L. J. Sharpe and
K. Newton, Does Politics Matter? The Determinants of Public Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
3 Carles Boix, Political Parties, Growth and Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998); Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and
Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
4 Donald E. Stokes, ‘Spatial Models of Party Competition’, American Political Science Review, 57
(1963), 368–77; Harold D. Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley, Political
Choice in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
5 Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government: Its Origins and Present State
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954); Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver, Party Policy in Modern
Democracies (London: Routledge, 2006); Peter Mair, ‘The Challenge to Party Government’, West
European Politics, 31 (2008), 211–34.
6 Schmidt, ‘When Parties Matter’.
7 Boix, Political Parties, Growth and Inequality; Huber and Stephens, Development and Crisis of the
Welfare State.
8 Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy; Torben Iversen and David Soskice, ‘Real Exchange
Rates and Competitiveness: The Political Economy of Skill Formation, Wage Compression, and Electoral
Systems’, American Political Science Review, 104 (2010), 601–23.
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party effects on public service performance is surprising given the acknowledged
importance of public services as an issue in many local, but also some national, elections.9
The use of data about local government to evaluate the empirical implications of theory
of general relevance is more common in economics – notably in examining political
incumbent behaviour and political institutions10 – than in mainstream political science but
the beneﬁts are being increasingly recognized.11 English local government is particularly,
valuable for evaluating models of party effects. Local government services are a key public
policy issue, taking a quarter of all public sector expenditure. Local governments have
considerable control over the way that the public services for which they are responsible are
delivered locally. There are a multitude of distinct government units operating under the
same institutions. Councils face frequent elections, with clear control by parties that have
distinct platforms, and there are occurrences of change in party control. Importantly, given
our interest in policy outcomes, local government in England most unusually offers
quantitative indicators of public service performance measured consistently for a number of
years across local units. The availability of performance data is a new direction for studies of
party effects, which have previously used expenditure and other resource data that are not
strictly measures of policy outcomes. In 2010, the central government ended the requirement
for much of the information used in this study to be collected systematically, making the
period a rare window of opportunity for research on this topic.
Our framework consists of three models of party effects on public service performance.
The ﬁrst model, developed from the traditional view of left–right party effects, argues that
parties of the left invest more in public service effectiveness than parties of the right. There
is always a budget constraint on service performance, and parties of the right tend to try
and keep tax down rather than spend to improve public services.12 Some authors further
argue that right-wing parties are less committed to public, as opposed to private sector
provision of services, in part because their supporters tend to make less use of public
services.13 The second, instrumental, model suggests that this view is wrong. Instead, all
parties are likely to form governments that care about the standard of public services
because voters respond to the performance of incumbents, and parties are keen to get
re-elected. Previous research suggests that service performance is a concern both for voters
and incumbent parties.14 The third, mixed, model proposes that party effects are contingent
on the discretion available to the ruling party as reﬂected in its seat share. This mixed model
9 Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Political Choice in Britain; J. Eric Oliver and Shang E. Ha,
‘Vote Choice in Suburban Elections’, American Political Science Review, 101 (2007), 393–408; George A.
Boyne, Oliver James, Peter John and Nicolai Petrovsky, ‘Democracy and Government Performance:
Holding Incumbents Accountable in English Local Governments’, Journal of Politics, 71 (2009), 1273–84.
10 Timothy Besley and Anne Case, ‘Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick
Competition’, American Economic Review, 85 (1995), 25–45; Besley and Case, ‘Political Institutions and
Policy Choices’.
11 Oliver and Ha, ‘Vote Choice in Suburban Elections’; Boyne, James, John and Petrovsky, ‘Democracy
and Government Performance’.
12 Jens Blom-Hansen, Lars Christian Monkerud and Rune Sørensen, ‘Do Parties Matter for Local
Revenue Policies? A Comparison of Denmark and Norway’, European Journal of Political Research,
45 (2006), 445–65; Imbeau, Pe´try and Lamari, ‘Left–Right Party Ideology and Government Policies’.
13 Paul Whiteley, ‘Public Opinion and the Demand for Social Welfare in Britain’, Journal of Social
Policy, 10 (1981), 453–76.
14 Boyne, James, John and Petrovsky, ‘Democracy and Government Performance’; Christopher R.
Berry and William G. Howell, ‘Accountability and Local Elections: Rethinking Retrospective Voting’,
Journal of Politics, 69 (2007), 844–58; Oliver and Ha, ‘Vote Choice in Suburban Elections’.
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suggests that the instrumental model is increasingly relevant as the degree of control by the
incumbent party declines, reducing its ability to implement party positions.
Our study enables us to ask whether the party effects model is correct in predicting that
right-wing parties in power are associated with worse public service performance. Or is
the instrumental model applicable such that all parties are interested in public service
performance? Or are party effects contingent with all parties concerned about performance as
their degree of political control decreases? The ﬁndings are of general relevance to contexts of
party government under circumstances where ruling parties have at least some autonomy of
action in bringing about a policy outcome and there is party-based electoral competition.
After developing the three theoretical models in more detail, we derive propositions about the
performance effects of parties and changes in party control, both overall and contingent on
different degrees of competition. Next, we introduce our research setting of English local
governments. Then we describe our data and explain our methods of analysis before
proceeding to our ﬁndings. Finally, we draw conclusions from our analysis and suggest future
directions for research.
THEORIES OF PARTY EFFECTS ON PUBLIC SERVICE PERFORMANCE
Political science has a long tradition of work on responsible party government. This line
of research entails the view that parties, rather than individual candidates, are the main
entities for democratic representation.15 In this view, elections provide competition
between two or more parties that recruit and nominate candidates and contend for power
as organizations. Parties provide policy options or offerings about competence to run
governments. Voters are assumed to be sufﬁciently informed to reward or punish incumbent
party governments based on their performance. All parties in power, regardless of ideology
and level of government, operate within this framework. Parties are assumed to have elements
of ofﬁce-seeking and policy-seeking motivations, whereby the former is a precondition for the
latter since being out of power bars a party from directly inﬂuencing policy.16 Parties provide
legislators with an organization to overcome their collective action problem. They provide a
cartel that attaches policies and a brand to legislators that helps them get re-elected.17
Our argument is that it is not enough for public authorities to enact a policy; it needs to
be implemented and for citizens to reward a governing party as a result. For example, an
elected assembly could pass laws improving ﬂood protection, but if the dykes and levees
are not reinforced citizens will not notice what the government did. The same issue exists
at the local level: if a local government announces that it will improve the collection of
waste but it does not do so, then it will not reap the electoral reward. If policy makers
announce policies that are just symbolic, the result could even be worse than doing
nothing at all. Our framework incorporates three models of how parties may operate: (i)
the ‘policy-seeking parties’ model; (ii) the ‘instrumental’ model; and (iii) the ‘mixed
behaviour dependent on party competition’ model. The three models are aligned on a
continuum, where the policy-seeking party model of party effects is at one end and the
15 In his The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government, Ranney surveys arguments for and against this
view.
16 Keman, ‘Parties and Government’, p. 161.
17 Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, Setting the
Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
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instrumental model of no party effects is at the other. The mixed model covers the space
between the two extremes of the policy-seeking party model and the instrumental model.
The Policy-Seeking Party Model
The policy-seeking party government model suggests that the political values of the party
in power will have meaningful consequences for the effectiveness of public services.
Parties have different programmes, which are a function of their constituency and
ideology,18 and research has shown that different parties in government produce
substantively different policies.19 This phenomenon is often referred to as mandate
theory: ‘voters expect parties to fulﬁl their promises once they are in ofﬁce, i.e. participate
in party government.’20 Mandate theory has been corroborated for British national
politics.21 The left–right dimension in party position is often suggested to be the most
salient. The literature on party control and economic performance shows theoretically
and empirically that left governments tend to introduce demand-side stimuli.22 They also
tend to co-ordinate with interest groups such as trade unions. Iversen and Soskice argue
that left-centre coalitions under proportional representation systems invest in training
policy and depress real wages, thus delivering good export performance in spite of high
exchange rates.23 Iverson and Stephens also argue that left party investment in education
in welfare states is consistent with their pursuit of economic efﬁciency and socially
progressive outcomes.24 More generally, the institutionalist literature on welfare states
observes that the correlation between left-party control and a large investment in welfare
creates a series of positive feedback loops between citizens and the state that improve
social conditions and lead to a high standard of services.25
But the existing literature on party control and economic performance does not
examine the effectiveness of incumbent parties in running the bureaucratic machine to
deliver public services. This omission is somewhat surprising given the emphasis that
opposition parties place in their pre-election claims on how they will govern better than
incumbents, focusing on government policy errors and waste, and trying to undermine the
way in which incumbents defend their records.
18 Keman, ‘Parties and Government’, p. 162.
19 Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert and Ian Budge, Parties, Policy and Democracy
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994); Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge
and Michael McDonald, Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments
in Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990–2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
20 Keman, ‘Parties and Government’, p. 171.
21 Richard I. Hofferbert and Ian Budge, ‘The Party Mandate and the Westminster Model: Election
Programmes and Spending in Britain, 1948–85’, British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 151–82;
MacDonald and Ian Budge, Elections, Parties, Democracy.
22 Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy; Garrett, Partisan Politics in the
Global Economy; Imbeau, Pe´try and Lamari, ‘Left–Right Party Ideology and Government Policies’;
Midtbø, ‘The Impact of Parties, Economic Growth, and Public Sector Expansion’; Swank, Global Capital,
Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States.
23 Torben Iversen and David Soskice, ‘Real Exchange Rates and Competitiveness: The Political
Economy of Skill Formation, Wage Compression, and Electoral Systems’, American Political Science
Review, 104 (2010), 601–23.
24 Torben Iversen and John D. Stephens, ‘Partisan Politics, the Welfare State, and Three Worlds of
Human Capital Formation’, Comparative Political Studies, 41 (2008), 600–37.
25 Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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The policy-seeking model suggests that politicians from different parties have distinctive
views about the role of the state and the value of public service performance. Parties of the
left are typically characterized as believing that public services can be used to improve the
welfare of disadvantaged groups in society and right parties as being more concerned about
keeping tax down rather than providing such services.26 Once in ofﬁce, parties of the left are
expected to focus their energies on public services – which beneﬁts their core voters and ﬁts
their ideology – and to achieve higher performance in these services than right parties, which
are expected to focus on goals that should conﬂict with service performance maximization,
such as tax cuts. Thus, in the policy-seeking party government model, distinct party effects on
performance are expected. By implication, such effects are also to be expected for changes in
political party control. If a government previously controlled by a party that prioritized
public services falls under the control of a party that prioritizes tax cuts, one would expect
public service performance to fall because of the shift in emphasis.
The Instrumental Party Model
Based on a long literature going back to Hotelling and Downs,27 the instrumental model
suggests that all parties maximize votes by satisfying the preferences of the median voter
(given the usual assumptions of the existence of a single policy dimension and exogenous,
single-peaked preferences). This tradition is consistent with research on party effects that
rejects the importance of left–right differences, arguing that it is at best an anachronistic view
of parties with these differences symptomatic of a more ideological age. Work of this kind has
instead stressed convergence in party policy platforms.28 If the standard of public services is
considered a valence issue there is then agreement across parties that better performance is
desirable.29 If all parties obtain an electoral beneﬁt by providing better services, then all are
expected to strive to achieve high public service performance. On this basis, the differences
between parties’ policy positions are likely to be small, so one would not expect to observe any
differences in public service performance regardless of which party controls a government.
The Mixed Behaviour Party Competition Model
The contrast between the policy-seeking party government model and the instrumental model
is stark. However, the models have been suggested as being relevant under different electoral,
legislative and governmental institutional contingencies. There is likely to be more policy
seeking when intra-party democracy is strong and beneﬁts of ofﬁce accrue even to parties
obtaining less than the plurality of votes, and more vote seeking when electoral uncertainty is
greater and the number of issue dimensions relative to the number of parties is high.30
An important factor inﬂuencing the demarcation between one model and the other is the
26 Blom-Hansen, Monkerud and Sørensen, ‘Do Parties Matter for Local Revenue Policies?’; Imbeau,
Pe´try and Lamari, ‘Left–Right Party Ideology and Government Policies’.
27 Harold Hotelling, ‘Stability in Competition’, Economic Journal, 39 (1929), 41–57; Anthony Downs,
An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
28 Boix, Political Parties, Growth and Inequality; Huber and Stephens, Development and Crisis of the
Welfare State.
29 Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Political Choice in Britain; Oliver James and Peter John,
‘Public Management at the Ballot Box: Performance Information and Electoral Support for Incumbent
English Local Governments’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17 (2007), 567–80;
Stokes, ‘Spatial Models of Party Competition’.
30 Kaare Strom, ‘A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties’, American Journal of Political
Science, 34 (1990), 565–98, pp. 588–91.
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degree of party competition. We suggest that this is reﬂected in the degree of control over the
government unit the ruling party has, as reﬂected in its share of seats. This share reﬂects the
current strength of the party in the government and inﬂuences the perceived probability that
the party currently forming the government will lose the next election. The mixed model
suggests that inter-party competition moderates the effects of party policy position.
The following propositions ﬂow from the three models:
(1) The policy-seeking party model suggests that left parties in government will be
associated with higher performance than right-wing parties in government. It also
suggests that a change to right-party rule is associated with a decline in subsequent
public service performance and a change to left-wing party rule is associated with an
improvement in subsequent public service performance.
(2) The instrumental model suggests that there is no difference between left-party and
right-party rule in terms of public service performance. It also suggests that a change
to either right-party or left-party rule is not associated with positive (left party) or
negative (right party) change in subsequent public service performance.
(3) The mixed behaviour party competition model suggests that the difference between
right-party and left-party effects decreases in magnitude as party competition increases.
The mixed model also suggests that the decline in public service performance associated
with a change to right-party rule and the improvement associated with a change to left-
party rule decrease in magnitude as party competition increases.
The three models of party effects are most relevant to contexts where there is an
electoral system that allows for clarity of responsibility, strong political parties that have
the capacity to implement policies affecting policy outcomes, and electorates with some
interest in public service performance. Political systems across many countries have these
features, particularly those with electoral systems with plurality/simple majority electoral
rules that tend to lead to a small number of strong parties that focus on their platforms,31
due to the strong position of party leaders.32 Within the United Kingdom, national
government has these features, as do other countries often classiﬁed as Westminster
systems at the national level, for example Canada and Australia. At the local or state
level, considerable variety is evident across countries, but strong parties are present in
many contexts. However, the models are most relevant where party government is evident
and least relevant to non-partisan governments, for example those that predominate in
over 75 per cent of local governments in the United States.33
To evaluate the hypotheses from the three models the research setting should have
variation in party control and competition across multiple governments but still have full
comparability between government units and the ability to control for other inﬂuences on
public service performance. The parties in control of governments need to have distinct
platforms that can be located on a left–right dimension and there must be occurrences of
31 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York:
Wiley, 1954); Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and
Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); Octavio Amorim
Neto and Gary W. Cox, ‘Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties’,
American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 149–74.
32 John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank
Ordering of Electoral Formulas’, Electoral Studies, 14 (1995): 417–39.
33 Oliver and Ha, ‘Vote Choice in Suburban Elections’, p. 394.
Party Control, Party Competition and Public Service Performance 647
elections resulting in changes in party control. Service provision must be an important
part of the activities of these governments, and they must be able to exercise some control
over service performance. Finally, the data on party control need to be combined with
reliable and valid quantitative indicators of public service performance measured consistently
for a number of years across several elections. Local government in England is one such
setting, which has the advantage of reducing any unobserved heterogeneity deriving from
varying national political cultures and the differential operation of political institutions across
nations and where there exists an ofﬁcial measurement of performance.34 For these reasons
we evaluate the models in the domain of English local government in the ﬁrst half of the
2000s, which offers an unusual and valuable opportunity for research of this kind.
DATA AND METHODS
We analyse the 148 principal units of English local government (London boroughs,
metropolitan districts, shire counties and unitary authorities). We track these local authorities
in a panel from ﬁnancial year 2002/03 up to and including ﬁnancial year 2006/07.35 These
local governments operated within the same broad institutional framework set by the central
government and held at least two elections within the time period under investigation. More
than half of the local governments in our sample held elections every year for three years
out of a four-year cycle.
There are three ideologically distinct major parties competing under a ﬁrst-past-
the-post electoral system: the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Left–right
differences between parties have been conceptualized in several ways.36 We place the parties on
a left–right dimension based on their stated policy position towards the importance of local
public services, which relates directly to our interest in the performance of these services. We
draw on data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) about these parties’ statements
in manifestos about the services that local government provides. We focus on this measure
rather than the Manifestos Project’s overall left–right measure of party position, which covers
broader attitudes to the economy and government intervention, which are substantially beyond
our focus of interest.37 In England, local party organizations are an integral part of national
parties. Moreover, national parties dominate local elections, both vote and seat shares.38 There
is no systematic approach to the production of local manifestos in England; while particular
local election materials are produced in some cases, often they are not. Instead, local branches of
the national parties communicate campaign statements during the election period. The national
election party manifestos set out policy positions and, in our period, all the parties’ national
manifestos contained extensive sets of statements about local government services. We examine
the national election manifestos for the 2001 and 2005 elections which, taken together, provides
a good indication of party policy positions both at the start and end of the period we examine.
The measure of the left–right party position we adopt examines the salience of services
that are provided by the local governments for each party as expressed by statements in the
manifestos. The index is calculated by adding up measures of the percentage of
34 Besley and Case, ‘Incumbent Behavior’.
35 In English local government, the ﬁnancial year runs from 1 April to 31 March.
36 Schmidt, ‘When Parties Matter’; Imbeau, Pe´try and Lamari, ‘Left–Right Party Ideology and
Government Policies’; Blom-Hansen, Monkerud and Sørensen, ‘Do Parties Matter for Local Revenue
Policies?’
37 Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge and McDonald, Mapping Policy Preferences II.
38 Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher, Local Elections in Britain (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 99.
648 BOYNE, JAMES, JOHN AND PETROVSKY
quasi-sentences in the manifesto document relating to the CMP categories of providing
services to protect the environment, the provision of cultural and leisure facilities, the
provision of social services and social security, and education provision. The variable
potentially ranges from 0 to 100 per cent with higher scores indicating greater salience of
these services in the party’s policy position. Evaluating the manifestos for the national
elections in 2001 and 2005, the Conservative party scored 18.37 and 20.30, the Liberal
Democrats 25.39 and 21.00, and Labour 25.19 and 30.30 in the two elections respectively.39
While the CMP dataset has been criticized,40 it has been used by an impressive range of
studies in political science, as noted by the creators of the data.41 For our purposes, a clear
difference is evident between the Labour party (noting the importance of public services to
this party as indicating a left position in the range 25.19 to 30.30 on the dimension we
identify) relative to the Conservative party (a right position on the dimension in the range
18.37 to 20.30). The Liberal Democrats are not clearly distinct in relative position and so
are not used in our analysis as a test of the left–right propositions; however, they are
retained to examine whether party control (as opposed to no party being in overall control
of a local government) is by itself a factor in inﬂuencing performance.
The CMP data we use to establish party-policy positions are consistent with other
evidence about the different party policies on public services. The Conservative party
tends to focus on tax reduction and on efﬁciency relative to Labour, which places more
stress on service effectiveness.42 The Labour party’s concern with service effectiveness
dates back to the Webbs’ view that all citizens should receive relevant services, as
determined by the government.43 It is also noted by Crosland,44 who stresses effectiveness,
particularly in social services and education, as a major concern of British socialists. The
Labour party’s contemporary interest in public service performance is reﬂected in a major
national government policy programme under the previous Labour administration of
prioritizing the improvement of public services.45 Consequently, under the policy-seeking
party model, one would expect councils controlled by Labour to achieve higher service
performance than similar councils controlled by the Conservatives. The Liberal
Democrats cannot be classiﬁed as easily on our public services left–right dimension and
are more heterogeneous internally on this issue than the two other main parties.46 The
coalition between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative party at the national level
since 2010 supports this view: they could have allied with parties of the left or right.
Within each local government unit, incumbent parties have considerable inﬂuence on
the methods by which services are delivered, which in turn have important consequences
39 Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge and McDonald, Mapping Policy Preferences II.
40 Kenneth Benoit, Michael Laver and Slava Mikhaylov, ‘Treating Words as Data with Error:
Uncertainty in Text Statements of Policy Positions’, American Journal of Political Science, 53 (2009),
495–513.
41 Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge and McDonald, Mapping Policy Preferences II.
42 Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd and Jeremy John Richardson, True Blues: The Politics of Conservative
Party Membership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 13; Rallings and Thrasher, Local Elections
in Britain; Judith Bara and Ian Budge, ‘Party Policy and Ideology: Still New Labour?’ Parliamentary
Affairs, 54 (2001), 590–606, p. 595.
43 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, English Poor Law History: Part II: The Last Hundred Years
(London: Frank Cass, 1963 [ﬁrst published 1929]).
44 Anthony Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London: Cape, 1956).
45 Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Political Choice in Britain.
46 Andrew Russell and Edward Fieldhouse, Neither Left Nor Right? The Liberal Democrats and the
Electorate (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).
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for the performance of these services. Whilst it has been pointed out that local socio-
economic conditions and other factors inﬂuence the quality of public services in a locality,
research still shows that individual local authorities operating different strategies have
the capacity to inﬂuence outcomes.47 Although local government implements much
legislation passed by government, it has managerial discretion over about a quarter of
public spending in the United Kingdom, some £180bn out of £681bn. Importantly for our
analysis, the same consistently measured performance indicators are available for all the
English local government units, a vital source of evidence that is in most cases not
available to researchers examining this topic in other domains.
Assessing party effects on public service performance outcomes using performance data
is a major advance on the only approaches previously available, which use data only on
expenditure. Such data would require the unjustiﬁed assumption that lower expenditure
levels are reﬂected in worse public service outcomes compared to higher spending levels.
Instead, spending may not be related directly to service performance. For example,
performance may not rise in line with increases in expenditure because of well-known
problems of policy implementation and inefﬁciency in service delivery, and spending cuts
may not damage performance if efﬁciency can be improved.
During the period of our study, all principal English local governments were responsible
for providing key public services, and their activities were limited by statute to focus on
these services. We use the Core Service Performance score (CSP) as a composite measure of
service quality and effectiveness. This measure has been used in previous studies of local
government performance.48 The CSP score is based on a set of standardized quantitative
performance indicators for all the local government service areas of primary and secondary
education, social services, environmental services including waste management and local
environmental protection, housing welfare beneﬁts, libraries and leisure, management of
resources, and housing. Based on the difference between these quantitative indicators and
their benchmarks (deﬁned by the Audit Commission), each local government receives a
score between 1 (lowest) and 4 (highest) for each of the six service areas. The scores for
education and social services, the two services consuming the most expenditure, are then
multiplied by four; the scores for environmental services and housing are multiplied by two;
and the scores for the remaining services are multiplied by one. Then these weighted scores
are added up. The maximum score is therefore 60, except in the case of counties, which do
not provide housing or welfare beneﬁts and therefore can achieve a maximum score of 48.
We adjusted our CSP using the same approach as Andrews et al.49 It shows the percentage
of the maximum possible core service performance achievable by each local government
unit. That is, for counties the denominator is 48 and for all other local governments it is 60.
The numerator is always the actual CSP achieved. All local governments are required to
collect the performance indicators using standardized procedures, and the Audit
Commission annually veriﬁed the integrity of these data, reducing the risk of illegitimate
manipulation of scores. Summary statistics on this and all other variables are provided in
Appendix Table A1.
47 Rhys Andrews, George A. Boyne and Richard M. Walker, ‘Strategy Content and Organizational
Performance: An Empirical Analysis’, Public Administration Review, 66 (2006), 52–63.
48 Andrews, Boyne and Walker, ‘Strategy Content and Organizational Performance’; Boyne, James,
John and Petrovsky, ‘Democracy and Government Performance’.
49 Rhys Andrews, George A. Boyne, Jennifer Law and Richard M. Walker, ‘External Constraints on
Local Service Standards’, Public Administration, 83 (2005), 639–56.
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Key Explanatory Variables: Political Party Control and Change in Control
Our explanatory variables concern party control and changes in party control of a
council. We draw our data from the Local Election Handbooks,50 the BBC local elections
coverage and the ‘Political Control in Great Britain’ maps issued by the consultancy PPS.
We provide further information on party control in Appendix Table A2 and an overview
of all changes in control in our estimation sample in Appendix Table A3. Throughout the
analysis, we consistently lag all indicators of party control and change in party control by
one year. The reasoning is that upon taking ofﬁce one or two months after the new
ﬁnancial year has begun (on 1 April), a new party majority will largely have to live with
the budget priorities set by their predecessors. In contrast, a year later they can be
expected to have altered the budget and other organizational characteristics that may be
linked to service performance. It would be foolish for them to wait any longer than
necessary, not only in the metropolitan boroughs with their frequent elections (three out
of every four years) but also in general, as the ﬁrst year with its honeymoon period is the
best time to make any changes.
To test Propositions 1 and 2 for the policy-seeking model, we look at political control as
well as change in control. First, we test whether party rule is or is not associated with
higher public service performance by means of three indicator variables for Conservative,
Labour and Liberal Democratic control. There are two ways in which we test
Propositions 1 and 2 against data on political control change. First, we specify
indicator variables for all three logically possible types of change in control: (i) change
from control by a single party to no overall control; (ii) change from no overall control to
control by a single party; and (iii) change from control by one single party to control by
another single party. Second, we consider changes to Conservative control, since
Proposition 1 would predict a drop in measured public service performance after the
Tories take ofﬁce. We include two indicator variables for change to Conservative party
control: (i) change from single-party control by either Labour or the Liberal Democrats
to Conservative control; and (ii) change from no overall control to Conservative control.
Of course, this includes council-years where the Conservatives continue to control a
council as opposed to taking it over, which is a tough test as new Conservative councils
would have to differ systematically even from councils already controlled by the
Conservatives if there was any public service performance effect (positive or negative) of
changes to Conservative party control. To test Proposition 3 against political party
control, we include two variables for each of the three major parties: (i) an indicator
variable that takes on the value of 1 if that party controls a council-year (0 if that party
does not control that council-year); and (ii) a variable containing the percentage of
council seats held by that party if and only if that party controls the council (0 otherwise).
Control Variables
Finally, we include a number of controls for factors known to affect public service
performance generally. The ﬁrst and most important control is past performance. Theory
suggests that organizations are autoregressive systems.51 The second important control
50 Michael Thrasher and Colin Rallings, Local Elections Handbook (Plymouth: Local Government
Chronicle Elections Centre, various years).
51 Laurence J. O’Toole Jr and Kenneth J. Meier, ‘Modeling the Impact of Public Management:
Implications of Structural Context’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 9 (1999), 505–26.
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variable is the claimant rate, which is an excellent proxy for the unemployment rate and,
therefore, for local economic conditions. Where these are worse, one can expect a greater
demand for social services and a host of other issues that are correlated with worse
economic conditions, all of which make it more difﬁcult to achieve high performance. The
third important control variable is the sum of grants a local government receives per
capita from the central government in a given year. This variable is created by summing
the Revenue Support Grant, receipts from the Non-Domestic Rate pool,52 and speciﬁc
grants both inside and outside the Aggregate External Finance framework. In addition,
by virtue of our estimation technique we automatically control for (relatively) ﬁxed
differences between authorities such as population and deprivation in all our models.
Also, we include time dummies to capture common shocks such as the terrorist attacks on
London in July 2005, which forced all local governments to look more closely into
disaster response, potentially affecting public service performance across the country.
Since we have an autoregressive speciﬁcation – i.e. we control for past performance – we
need to take special care in estimating our models. In the presence of a lagged dependent
variable, pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) is consistent only if there is no unobserved
heterogeneity – time-invariant differences between local authorities that are not fully measured
– and no serial correlation. If there is unobserved heterogeneity, the coefﬁcient on the past
value of performance will tend to be exaggerated as it absorbs a large amount (but not all) of
the unobserved heterogeneity. This is not a major problem necessarily as it is likely to make it
harder to ﬁnd evidence in accordance with the political change hypotheses. Yet, since we
prefer to obtain the most accurate estimates, we use an instrumental variables estimator,
which allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity while removing any bias that the
correction for unobserved heterogeneity (differencing) might have induced in the coefﬁcient
on the lagged dependent variable. Arellano and Bond developed this estimator.53
Finally, we also control for the overall upward trend in performance (as measured by
the CSP over the period of our study) by including a constant term, which in the
Arellano–Bond model is a trend term because both sides of the estimating equation are
ﬁrst-differenced.
52 The Non-Domestic Rate is a business tax levied that is uniform across England. While local
governments collect it, they transfer all of it to a common pool administered by the central government,
which then redistributes the funds to local governments according to population.
53 See Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond, ‘Some Tests of Speciﬁcation for Panel Data: Monte Carlo
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations’, Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1991): 277–97.
A potential problem of this estimator is that, while it is consistent, it may not perform well in samples of
limited size, such as ours. One simple check for this is to verify whether the Arellano–Bond estimates of
the coefﬁcient on the lagged dependent variable lie between those obtained by ﬁxed effects with a lagged
dependent variable, and ordinary least squares with a lagged dependent variable, or at least not
signiﬁcantly outside this range. The rationale for this check is that, in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity, these two estimators are inconsistent. The estimated coefﬁcients on the lagged dependent
variable tend to be small in the former case and too large in the latter (see Stephen R. Bond, ‘Dynamic
Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and Practice’, Portuguese Economic Journal,
1 (2002), 141–162, p. 144). In all our models, the range between these two coefﬁcient estimates is indeed
large, and all our Arellano–Bond lagged dependent variable coefﬁcient estimates lie strictly between the
ﬁxed effects and the OLS estimate. A further check of the estimator is to test for the ﬁrst-order and
second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals. While their ﬁrst-order serial correlation should
be negative, as it is for all our speciﬁcations, the second-order serial correlation should be zero. Due to the
shortness of our panel, we cannot test for the latter. Nevertheless, our other checks do not indicate major
problems with using this estimator.
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RESULTS
Our ﬁndings lead us to call into question the left–right party effects model of
performance. As Table 1 shows, left-party (Labour) control is associated with a 2.7
percentage point higher CSP than where no party is in control. Liberal Democratic
control is statistically indistinguishable from no overall control. However, the ﬁndings
about right-party (Conservative) control are ﬂatly inconsistent with this ﬁrst model.
Conservative control is associated with a 3.7 percentage point higher CSP, with the
Labour and Conservative control coefﬁcients being statistically equal (p5 0.55).54
Since these ﬁndings have been identiﬁed from changes in political party control, it is
worth looking at these changes directly. We start by examining different forms of change
in party control. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 2, which conﬁrms that
changes on their own, without looking at the party label, tend neither to hurt nor to harm
public service performance.
Table 3 examines under what conditions there is a boost to public service performance
when a Conservative administration takes over.55 The CSP tends to rise by 2.5 percentage
TABLE 1 Testing for Effects of Political Party Control on Public Service Performance
Model 1
Dependent variable: CSP
Lagged CSP 0.482
(4.02)***
Lagged Conservative Party control (D) 3.663
(2.13)**
Lagged Labour Party control (D) 2.698
(2.17)**
Lagged Liberal Democratic control (D) 22.727
(1.51)
Claimant rate (in %) 24.138
(2.81)***
Central grants received per capita (in £1,000’s)d 21.399
(0.38)
Financial year 2005 (D) 28.377
(8.13)***
Financial year 2006 (D) 27.232
(4.49)***
Constant 2.255
(3.36)***
Number of observations 434
Number of local governments 148
Wald x2 (df) 112.03 (8)
p-value p, 0.0001
Note: Huber–White z-statistics are listed in parentheses. * Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at
5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. (D) indicates a dummy variable.
54 Our ﬁndings on the effects of the three parties on public service performance remain substantively
unchanged when previous experience governing the same local government is taken into account.
55 These ﬁndings also hold when change to Conservative party control is disaggregated into those
observations where the change is from control by another party (four instances) and where the change is
from no overall control (thirteen instances).
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points. Though most changes are to right-wing party control, four councils also changed to
Labour, although this did not lead to a performance change.56 Overall, our ﬁndings suggest
a boost to performance from both left-party and right-party control but not from Liberal
Democrat control, a party that because of its internal heterogeneity we could not place at a
clear position on the left–right policy dimension, an issue we return to in the conclusion.
We now turn to the ﬁndings about the moderating effect of party competition on party
effects on performance. Table 4 contains a closer look at the ﬁndings from Table 1 in the
context of the effects of party control moderated by the seat share held by the governing party.
To test for the impact of control by a party, one needs to look at the total impact of that
party, which is measured by the coefﬁcient on the party indicator variable plus the product of
the percentage of seats held and the coefﬁcient on the seat percentage. This information is
TABLE 2 Testing for Effects of Changes in Political Party Control on Public Service
Performance
Model 2
Dependent variable: CSP
Lagged CSP 0.460
(3.95)***
Lag of change from party- NOC (D) 20.626
(0.63)
Lag of change from NOC - party (D) 1.832
(1.33)
Lag of change from party i- party j (D) 21.194
(1.44)
Claimant rate (in %) 23.477
(2.41)**
Central grants received per capita (in £1,000s) 20.886
(0.25)
Financial year 2005 (D) 28.211
(7.87)***
Financial year 2006 (D) 27.251
(4.48)***
Constant 2.190
(3.26)***
Number of observations 434
Number of local governments 148
Wald x2 (df) 96.94 (8)
p-value p, 0.0001
Note: Huber–White z-statistics are listed in parentheses. * Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at
5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. (D) indicates a dummy variable.
56 Each instance can be described in full: Plymouth went from Conservative to Labour control in 2003
with CSP rising from 50 to 52. Oldham went from No Overall Control in 2002 to Labour majority control
in 2003 with CSP rising from 65 to 72. Shefﬁeld went from No Overall Control to Labour majority
control in 2003 with CSP rising from 65 to 73. Finally, Hartlepool went from No Overall Control to
Labour majority control in 2004 with its CSP of 87 falling to 82. This conclusion holds when the local
performance improvements are compared against the national rising trend on the CSP, Plymouth and
Hartlepool being worse and Oldham and Shefﬁeld slightly better.
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provided in Figure 1 for the CSP. The ﬁgure shows the estimated impact of party i as well as
the 90 per cent conﬁdence intervals (the curved dashed lines above and below the estimated
impact). Where the conﬁdence interval does not include the horizontal zero line, the impact of
party i is statistically signiﬁcant based on the joint signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients rather than
on the signiﬁcance of individual coefﬁcients separately (which are reported in Table 4 and
which do not meet the same level of signiﬁcance when considered one at a time).
As the effect of party control now depends on the seat share, a number of ﬁgures provide
overviews of the range of effects. Figure 1 shows the effects of three major parties on the CSP.
To provide an example of how the marginal effects in Figure 1 are derived, ﬁrst note that it
draws upon the ﬁrst column of results in Table 4. Figure 1 depicts the effect of Conservative
party control compared to no overall control, depending on the percentage seat majority held
by the Conservative incumbent. This effect is derived by adding the raw coefﬁcient on lag of
Conservative party control (7.477) with the product of the percentage of seats held times the
raw coefﬁcient on the interaction of Conservative party control and percentages of seats held
by the Conservatives (20.068). Suppose we have a Conservative incumbent holding 55 per
cent of council seats. The effect of Conservative party control compared to no overall control
is then 7.4771(55) 3 (20.068)53.737, that is, on average the CSP tends to be nearly four
points higher for a Conservative majority of 55 per cent of seats compared to no overall
control. This information is provided in the left panel of Figure 1 as part of the presentation
of change in CSP for the whole range of plausible majorities. Figure 1 shows that the positive
effects of both Conservative and Labour control on performance only occur where the
political environment is competitive, namely where majorities are moderate (no more than
about 65 per cent of council seats), and therefore there is a reasonable chance that they will
TABLE 3 Testing for Effects of Changes to Conservative Party Control on Public
Service Performance
Model 3
Dependent variable: CSP
Lagged CSP 0.463
(3.99)***
Lag of change to Conservative control (D) 2.534
(1.94)*
Claimant rate (in %) 23.612
(2.50)**
Central grants received per capita (in £1,000s) 20.920
(0.25)
Financial year 2005 (D) 28.148
(7.92)***
Financial year 2006 (D) 27.058
(4.37)***
Constant 2.122
(3.16)***
Number of observations 434
Number of local governments 148
Wald x2 (df) 104.02 (6)
p-value p, 0.0001
Note: Huber–White z-statistics are listed in parentheses. * Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at
5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. (D) indicates a dummy variable.
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lose the next election, forcing them to focus more on public service performance. The Liberal
Democrats’ performance is also better the smaller their seat share, indicating that the
moderating effect of party competition is present for all the main political parties.
Table 5 builds on the analysis underlying Table 3 by showing the effects of changes to
Conservative party control moderated by the seat share held by the new Conservative
administration.57 In a similar fashion to Table 4 for party control, Table 5 contains a test of the
proposition about the moderating effect of party competition (Proposition 3). There
are two indicator variables: (i) change from single-party control by either Labour or the
TABLE 4 Testing for Effects of Political Party Control on Public Service
Performance, Moderated by Seat Share
Model 4
Dependent variable: CSP
Lagged CSP 0.494
(4.18)***
Lag of Conservative party control (D) 7.374
(0.49)
Lag of (Cons. ctrl. 3 % seats held by Cons.) 20.068
(0.27)
Lag of Labour party control (D) 8.186
(1.34)
Lag of (Labour ctrl. 3 % seats held by Labour) 20.096
(0.92)
Lag of Liberal Dem. control (D) 30.345
(1.37)
Lag of (Lib. Dem. ctrl. 3 % seats held by Lib Dem) 20.570
(1.50)
- interpretation See Figure 1
Claimant rate (in %) 24.220
(2.85)***
Central grants received per capita (in £1,000’s) 21.753
(0.47)
Financial year 2005 (D) 28.591
(8.10)***
Financial year 2006 (D) 27.397
(4.49)***
Constant 2.328
(3.42)***
Number of observations 434
Number of local governments 148
Wald x2 (df) 124.98 (11)
p-value p, 0.0001
Note: Coefﬁcients in italics cannot be meaningfully interpreted in isolation. Please refer to Figure 1
for the impact of party control. Huber–White z-statistics are listed in parentheses. * Signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. (D) indicates a dummy variable.
57 As in Table 3, the ﬁndings in Table 5 also hold when change to Conservative party control is
disaggregated into those observations where the change is from control by another party (four instances)
and where the change is from no overall control (thirteen instances).
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Liberal Democrats to Conservative control; and (ii) change from no overall control to
Conservative control. The base (omitted) group consists of council-years with no change to
Conservative control. In addition, for each of these two sets of changes to Conservative control
there is a variable containing the percentage of council seats held by the new Conservative
majority (0 if there is no change to Conservative control). As in Table 4, to test the impact of a
change to Conservative control, one needs to look at the total impact of the change to
Conservative control, which is measured by the coefﬁcient on the change to Conservative
indicator variable plus the product of the percentage of seats held and the coefﬁcient on the
change to Conservative control interaction with seat percentage. This information is provided
in Figure 2, which is constructed using the same method as for Figure 1 but shows the effects of
a change to Conservative control on the CSP. This score increases following a change to
Conservative control only if the new Conservative majority is less than 60 per cent of council
seats and is higher the smaller the majority the local party has in government.
CONCLUSIONS
The ﬁndings strongly support the importance of party competition as incorporated in the
mixed model of party effects. Conservative and Labour incumbents that do not have
overwhelming control of their councils produce the improvements to performance found in
our study. The Liberal Democrats perform better under these circumstances too. However,
the left–right party position model is not supported in our data, and we suggest that, if it ever
was applicable, it certainly does not apply to contemporary local government in England.
Instead, we ﬁnd positive links between control by a right party – the Conservatives – and
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Fig. 1. The impact of party control (lagged 1 year) on the CSP depending on the percentage of seats held by
the party in control
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public service performance in addition to positive links between control by a major left party
(Labour) and public service performance. It appears to be the case that right parties are better
able to run public services than the traditional left–right policy view suggests, perhaps in a
more competitive globalized context where national policies follow more market principles
policies are more informed by market principles and the focus on performance of the New
Public Management.58 The ﬁndings suggest that right parties, at least in a period of relatively
low ﬁscal pressure, are able to improve the performance of public services and may be able to
make more stringent decisions on internal divisions and may be freer from employees’
organizations to carry out service reforms than left parties that have ties to trade unions.
Either way, the beneﬁts of implementing a clear policy position towards public services are
shown by the relatively poorer performance of the Liberal Democrats who could not easily be
placed on the policy dimension we analyse and whose performance in government was not as
good as the other two parties.
TABLE 5 Testing for Effects of Changes to Conservative Party Control, Moderated
by Seat Share
Model 5
Dependent variable: CSP
Lagged CSP 0.464
(4.02)***
Lag of change to Conservative ctrl. (D) 25.502
(2.34)**
Lag of (Cons. ctrl. onset 3 % seats held by Cons.) 20.401
(2.31)**
- interpretation See Figure 2
Claimant rate (in %) 23.544
(2.45)**
Central grants received per capita (in £1,000’s) 20.760
(0.21)
Financial year 2005 (D) 28.124
(7.90)***
Financial year 2006 (D) 27.056
(4.38)***
Constant 2.103
(3.15)***
Number of observations 434
Number of local governments 148
Wald x2 (df) 111.90 (7)
p-value p, 0.0001
Notes: Coefﬁcients in italics cannot be meaningfully interpreted in isolation. Please refer to
Figure 2 for the impact of a change to Conservative control. Huber–White z-statistics are listed
in parentheses. * Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. (D) indicates a
dummy variable.
58 Michael Barzelay, The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001). The ‘New Public Management’ is a summary term for a wave of
public administration reforms enacted by many countries, but particularly the United Kingdom, New
Zealand and Australia.
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The evidence supports the valence politics interpretation of much electoral competition,
that of with parties trying to manage public services to produce maximum beneﬁts to the
electorate in addition to governments’ traditional concerns about economic management.59
Our ﬁndings refer to outcomes for performance, in contrast to earlier studies that ﬁnd
left–right party effects in terms of expenditure. This approach calls into question the many
cross-national studies of party effects on policies that are operationalized as spending. We
ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in service performance in a context where spending is largely set by
central government and is formula-based, suggesting that the variation of interest to citizens
is unlikely to be captured by variables on spending alone. As more jurisdictions make
available performance data, rich opportunities for students of party effects will develop.
It appears that the real distinction in terms of public service performance may be based not
on party position or ideology but on other political factors that merit further research. In
particular, party control is associated with better performance than non-party control for
both the Conservatives and Labour parties. These are parties with much experience in
governing at all levels of government and relatively stronger party discipline compared to the
Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats tend to be more heterogeneous as a governing
group locally and less subject to central leadership than the other parties, perhaps making
their situation more similar to cases of no overall control and making it more difﬁcult for
them to play the game of valence politics.60 These ﬁndings from local government have
implications for the Liberal Democrats’ capacity to act as a responsible party of national
government, a role they now ﬁnd themselves performing for the ﬁrst time in the United
Kingdom. Strategic management capacity for the government unit, then, seems to emerge as
an important determinant of public service performance, but on the political side rather than
its more conventional interpretation in terms of the capacity of administrators.
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59 Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Political Choice in Britain; Boyne, James, John and
Petrovsky, ‘Democracy and Government Performance’.
60 Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd and Antony Billinghurst, Third Force Politics: Liberal Democrats at the
Grassroots (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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The competitiveness of party government emerged as the determining factor affecting each
governing party’s performance, as reﬂected in the mixed model. Service performance was
higher the more competitive a situation the governing party found itself in. Future work on
party effects will be improved if more account is taken of the role of party competitiveness.
The implication is that there is an incentive in competitive party government to improve public
services rather than just apply resources to the voters or deal in symbolic policy promises. To
the extent that such incentives exist, it offers a major beneﬁt to representative government and
shows that the absence of party government could harm the voters. Not only do parties
perform the essential functions of aggregation and policy making, they help improve the
quality of services, especially when compared to the absence of responsible party government.
APPEND IX
TABLE A1 Summary Statistics
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
CSP 69.7 8.4 40.0 90.0
Lagged Conservative Party control (D) 0.27 0.45 0 1
Lagged Labour Party control (D) 0.34 0.48 0 1
Lagged Liberal Democratic control (D) 0.09 0.28 0 1
Lag of change from Labour or Lib. Dem. to
Conservative control (D)
0.01 0.10 0 1
Lag of change from NOC to Conservative control (D) 0.03 0.17 0 1
Claimant rate (in %) 2.6 1.2 0.5 5.9
Central grants received per capita (in £1,000) 1.4 0.5 0.6 3.6
Note: Model 1 estimation sample: 434 observations on 148 local governments.
TABLE A2 Observations by Political Party Control
Conservative control 119
Labour control 149
Liberal Democratic control 37
No Overall Control 129
Note: Model 1 estimation sample.
TABLE A3 Disaggregating of Changes in Political Party Control
Changes to Conservative control 17
Labour- Conservatives 3
Liberal Democrats - Conservatives 1
No Overall Control- Conservatives 13
Changes to Labour control 4
Conservatives- Labour 1
Liberal Democrats - Labour 0
No Overall Control- Labour 3
Changes to Liberal Democratic control 8
Conservatives- Liberal Democrats 1
Labour- Liberal Democrats 2
No Overall Control- Liberal Democrats 5
Note: Model 1 estimation sample.
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